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KEES WAALDIJK* 
 
The right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings 
was first articulated—as an aspect of the right to respect for private life—
by the European Commission of Human Rights in 1976.  Since then such a 
right has been recognized in similar words by national and international 
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court (Roberts v.  United States 
Jaycees), the European Court of Human Rights (Niemietz v. Germany), the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa (National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice), and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (Fernández Ortega v. Mexico).  This lecture traces the 
origins of this right, linking it to the meaning of the word “orientation” 
and to the basic psychological need for love, affection, and belongingness.  
It proposes to speak of “the right to relate” and argues that this right can 
be seen as the common theme in all issues of sexual orientation law 
(ranging from decriminalization and anti-discrimination to the recognition 
of refugees and of same-sex parenting).  This right can be used as the 
common denominator in the comparative study of all those laws in the 
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world that are anti-homosexual or that are same-sex-friendly.  The right to 
establish (same-sex) relationships implies both a right to come out and a 
right to come together.  The right to develop (same-sex) relationships is 
being made operational through legal respect, legal protection, legal 
recognition, legal formalization, and legal recognition of foreign 
formalization. 
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I. “ORIENTATION” 
In older days, before there were students and professors in Leiden, this 
academic building was a church.  It was built some 500 years ago as part of 
a convent of Dominican nuns.1  The poor nuns had to make do with this 
plot of land, which was not suitable to build a church with its main altar 
towards the east.2  Eastward looking churches had been the custom for 
many centuries.3  That custom had continued the pre-Christian tradition of 
 
 1.  See TH. H. LUNSINGH SCHEURLEER ET AL., HET RAPENBURG: GESCHIEDENIS VAN EEN LEIDSE 
GRACHT – DEEL VIB: HET RIJCK VAN PALLAS 786 (1992) (concluding that the church was built around 
1507 and possibly inaugurated in 1516).  In 1581, the six-year-old Leiden University moved into the 
building, dividing the church space into three lecture halls and a senate room.  WILLEM OTTERSPEER, 
GROEPSPORTRET MET DAME I: HET BOLWERK VAN DE VRIJHEID – DE LEIDSE UNIVERSITEIT 1575–1672, 
at 115 (2000). 
 2.  LUNSINGH SCHEURLEER ET AL., supra note 1. 
 3.  Maurice M. Hassett, Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Orientation of Churches, 
WIKISOURCE.ORG, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Orientation_of_ 
Churches (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (“From the eighth century the propriety of the eastern apse was 
universally admitted, though, of course strict adherence to this architectural canon, owing to the 
WAALDIJK MACRO CORRECTED CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  3:14 PM 
2013] THE RIGHT TO RELATE 163 
directing the axis of important buildings towards the Orient, towards the 
rising sun.4  So, perhaps grudgingly, the nuns had to accept that their 
convent’s church would have an unusual orientation, with the altar either at 
the south end, from where I am speaking now, or perhaps for some time 
near the building’s north face, where the entrance now is.5  The nuns could 
not therefore follow the strong convention in architecture that has given us 
the word “orientation.” 
One of my roles as professor is to establish and develop relationships 
with colleagues and students.  Establishing relationships is a key part of 
education. Among other things, education must be student-oriented.  A 
good teacher not only offers students good insights, knowledge, skills, and 
inspiration but also listens to the students and learns from them. 
Some people will be surprised or disappointed now, having expected 
that a professor of comparative sexual orientation law would speak about 
sex.  Indeed, as the topic for today, I have chosen to focus on one of the 
other words in the title of my chair: the word “orientation.” 
The word “orientation” is used in different contexts.6  It is stronger 
than “direction,” “position,” “inclination,” or “preference.”  Orientation 
implies being directed—or directing oneself—towards something or 
someone with which one wants to interact in a meaningful way.  In the 
oldest pre-Christian example, this was probably the worshipping or 
welcoming of the rising sun.  Being oriented towards something or 
someone is about relating to that thing or person.  This relational dimension 
is present in the orientation of a religious building, in the orientation of a 
good teaching method, and also in the concept of “sexual orientation.” 
“Sexual orientation” is about how one relates to men or women.  At a 
certain moment, many of us find out that we relate differently to women 
than to men.  Before we start relationships, we have already begun relating 
to others. 
In international and European law, “sexual orientation” is the main 
generic term used to cover homosexuality, heterosexuality, and 
bisexuality.7  In international and European case law, the term “sexual 
 
direction of city streets, was not always possible.”). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See LUNSINGH SCHEURLEER ET AL., supra note 1, at 787 (expressing skepticism regarding an 
earlier suggestion that the altar had first been located at the north end of the church). 
 6.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “orientation” as, inter alia, “[a] person’s basic 
attitude, beliefs, or feelings; a person’s emotional or intellectual position in respect of a particular topic, 
circumstance, etc.; (now) spec. sexual preference.”  Orientation Definition, OED.COM (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/132540?redirectedFrom=orientation. 
 7.  E.g., KEES WAALDIJK & MATTEO BONINI-BARALDI, SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL LAWS AND THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY DIRECTIVE 96, 205–06 
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orientation” is mostly used to refer to (homosexual) behavior8 and to 
(same-sex) relationships.9  Less frequently the term is used to refer to 
homo-, hetero-, or bisexual persons or to their feelings or identities.10  This 
is simply because in law, the problems tend to focus on homosexual 
behavior and homosexual relationships.  Therefore, in law, the words 
“sexual orientation” are mostly used to indicate a characteristic of behavior 
or relationships,11 not to indicate a characteristic of persons.12 
 
(2006). 
 8.  Homosexual behavior is the issue in many of the sexual orientation cases that have been 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights.  See PAUL JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS app. 2 at 231–47  (2013) (listing the “key issue” for every case, 
many of which concern behavior).  The European Court of Human Rights has stated that it considers 
legal distinctions between same-sex and different-sex sexual behavior as a form of sexual orientation 
discrimination.  S.L. v. Austria, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, 77–78; L and V v. Austria, 2003-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 29, 42–43 (both addressing the development of jurisprudence under Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation, in the 
context of legislation creating a higher age of consent for homosexual acts than for heterosexual acts).  
In Toonen v. Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee implicitly came to the same 
conclusion.  Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶¶ 2.1, 8.7, 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994) 
(holding that the criminalization of sexual contacts between men violates the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights). 
 9.  See Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, ¶¶ 76, 84 (considering a distinction in rent 
law between unmarried same-sex and unmarried different-sex partners as a form of sexual orientation 
discrimination); see also Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 2008 
E.C.R. I-1757, ¶ 72 (holding that a distinction between married different-sex partners and registered 
same-sex partners regarding pensions potentially constitutes “direct discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation”); Case C-249/96, Grant v. S.W. Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-621, ¶ 47 (considering a 
distinction between unmarried same-sex and unmarried different-sex partners regarding the spousal 
benefit of free train rides for the partner of a railway employee); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Young v. 
Australia, Comm. No. 941/2000, ¶¶ 10.4, 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Aug. 6, 2003) 
(considering a distinction regarding pensions, similar to that made in Karner, as discrimination “on the 
basis of . . . sex or sexual orientation”); Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 133 (Feb. 24, 2012) (“[T]he scope of the right 
to non-discrimination due to sexual orientation is not limited to the fact of being a homosexual per se, 
but includes its expression and the ensuing consequences in a person’s life project.”). 
 10.  Cases involving the gay or lesbian identity of an individual (including cases on military 
employment or asylum and most parenting cases) only make up a small minority of the cases on sexual 
orientation decided by the European Court of Human Rights.  See JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 231–47 
(listing cases whose key issue is “Prohibition of homosexuality in armed forces” or “Discrimination in 
adoption of a child”).  The first time the Court used the words “sexual orientation” in this sense was in a 
custody case.  See Mouta v. Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, ¶ 28. 
 11.  WAALDIJK & BONINI-BARALDI, supra note 7, at 213–14; see also ROBERT WINTEMUTE, 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION, AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 6–10 (1995) (distinguishing four senses in which the 
words “sexual orientation” can be used); John C. Gonsiorek et al., Definition and Measurement of 
Sexual Orientation, 25 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 40, 41 (1995) (“It is important to note 
that a person’s sexual behavior can be same-sex oriented, yet that person may not self-identify as 
such.”).  Strangely, the preamble of The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity inadvertently 
contains a definition that only seems to be directly applicable to persons; it understands “sexual 
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Among the various non-discrimination grounds, religion is probably 
the most similar to sexual orientation because both are mainly about 
behavior (and so are the corresponding fundamental rights: the freedom of 
religion and belief and the right to establish and develop relationships with 
other human beings).  Other categories in international non-discrimination 
law, such as sex and race, are mainly seen as something people are born 
with.  This distinction is only relative, of course.  Sex and race also have 
behavioral aspects: think of pregnancy or of inter-ethnic marriages.  And 
many people experience their religious orientation or their “gay gene” as 
something with which they are born,13 something they cannot change.  It 
seems true, however, that religion and sexual orientation are both much 
more about behavior than are sex and race.  Of the hundreds of cases 
involving sexual orientation that I have come across, a large majority 
involve sexual behavior, same-sex kissing, same-sex relationships, or 
information about homosexuality.14  A similar claim can probably be made 
about court cases about religion, many of which do not concern someone’s 
being (of a certain religion) but someone’s behavior (associated with a 
certain religion).  The behavioral aspects of religion are included in the 
prohibition of discrimination, just as they are in the freedom of religion.15  
These protections probably exist because the behavior that is central to 
religion/belief or sexual orientation is not just any behavior but behavior 
corresponding to a deep inescapable need to relate to other human beings 
(and/or, as the case may be, divine beings).  Respect for religion, like 
 
orientation” to refer to “each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction 
to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more 
than one gender.”  THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 
8 (2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org [hereinafter THE YOGYAKARTA 
PRINCIPLES].. 
 12.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “sexual orientation” as “[o]riginally: (the process of) 
orientation with respect to a sexual goal, potential mate, partner, etc.  Later chiefly: a person’s sexual 
identity in relation to the gender to whom he or she is usually attracted; (broadly) the fact of being 
heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual. In early use prob. not a fixed collocation.”  Sexual Orientation 
Definition, OED.COM (June 2012), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/261213?redirectedFrom=sexual+ 
orientation.  It seems that the more active original meaning of the term is present in the legal use of 
“sexual orientation” to refer to (same-sex) behavior and relationships.  As I understand, “sexual 
orientation” is rendered in Chinese as “Xing QingXiang,” with the old word “QingXiang” meaning 
something like “looking forward to.” 
 13.  VICTORIA CLARKE ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND QUEER PSYCHOLOGY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 26, 33 (2010). 
 14.  See cases cited supra notes 8–10. 
 15.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), explicitly states that “this right includes . . . freedom . . . to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”. 
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respect for sexual orientation, requires respect for the practice of it.16 
My chair is in comparative sexual orientation law.  In practice I will 
focus my research and teaching on the legal aspects of homosexual 
orientation, often in comparison with the legal aspects of heterosexual 
orientation.  I will primarily compare laws of different countries and laws 
of different international organizations. 
I would like to offer an understanding of why homosexual orientation 
is increasingly being recognized and protected in international and 
European law and in the laws of more and more countries in the world.  In 
doing so, I will propose a common denominator that can be used in the 
comparative study of sexual orientation law across the continents. 
II. A DISCIPLINE 
My goal today is not only to find such a common denominator but 
also to further establish and develop my discipline: sexual orientation law.  
It is a new field that has been rapidly growing over the last few decades, a 
field consisting of a wide range of legal phenomena.  Let me mention the 
most important phenomena in this field: 
• Criminalization or decriminalization of homosexual 
behavior;17 
• legislation against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation;18 
 
 16.  For a more comprehensive analysis of the analogy between religion and sexual orientation, 
see generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER, 
RELIGION AS ANALOGIES (1999). 
 17.  See, e.g., CRIMINALLY QUEER: HOMOSEXUALITY AND CRIMINAL LAW IN SCANDINAVIA 
1842–1999 (Jens Rydström & Kati Mustola eds., 2007); HELMUT GRAUPNER, SEXUALITÄT, 
JUGENDSCHUTZ UND MENSCHENRECHTE: ÜBER DAS RECHT VON KINDERN UND JUGENDLICHEN AUF 
SEXUELLE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG: TEIL 1 & TEIL 2 (1997) (giving in Part 2 a detailed comparative history 
of sexual offenses law in almost all European countries); ALOK GUPTA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS 
ALIEN LEGACY: THE ORIGINS OF “SODOMY” LAWS IN BRITISH COLONIALISM (2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/12/17/alien-legacy-0; BRIAN WHITAKER, UNSPEAKABLE LOVE: GAY 
AND LESBIAN LIFE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2006) (discussing the legal situation in most countries in the 
region); Michael Kirby, Lessons from the Wolfenden Report, 34 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 551 (2008) 
(discussing the 1957 report that had an impact on decriminalization of homosexual behavior in many 
countries); Douglas E. Sanders, 377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British Colonialism in Asia, 4 ASIAN 
J. COMP. L. 1 (2009) (discussing how the colonial prohibition in India of “carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature” is still largely in force in most former British colonies in Asia). 
 18.  See, e.g., MARK BELL, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002); 
DAVID RAYSIDE, QUEER INCLUSIONS, CONTINENTAL DIVISIONS: PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF SEXUAL 
DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (2008); EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HOMOPHOBIA, TRANSPHOBIA AND DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 13–16 (2010), available at http://fra. 
europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/2010/2010_en.htm; WAALDIJK & 
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• human rights challenges to anti-homosexual laws and 
practices;19 
• specific criminalization of anti-homosexual violence;20 
• regulation of information about homosexual orientation;21 
• asylum being given or refused to individuals fleeing from 
anti-homosexual persecution;22 
• recognition or non-recognition of same-sex couples;23 
 
BONINI-BARALDI, supra note 7; ISABELLE CHOPIN & THIEN UYEN DO, EUROPEAN NETWORK OF LEGAL 
EXPERTS IN THE NON-DISCRIMINATION FIELD,  DEVELOPING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN EUROPE: 
THE 27 EU MEMBER STATES COMPARED (2010), available at http://www.migpolgroup.com/ 
publications_detail.php?id=320; Mark Bell, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation: Alternative 
Pathways in EU Equality Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 127 (2012). 
 19.  See, e.g., ALLI JERNOW, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER 
IDENTITY AND JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE LAW CASEBOOK (2011), available at 
http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Sexual-orientation-gender-identity-
and-Justice-report-2011.pdf; WINTEMUTE, supra note 11; Nicholas Bamforth, Legal Protection of 
Same-Sex Partnerships and Comparative Constitutional Law, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
551 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Laurence R. Helfer, Finding a Consensus on 
Equality: The Homosexual Age of Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1044 (1990); Sebastian Maguire, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities in Africa, 35 CAL. W.  
INT’L L.J. 1 (2004). 
 20.  See, e.g., COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN EUROPE 83–102 (2nd ed. 2011), available at http:// 
www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf. 
 21.  See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts 
of Violence against Individuals Based On Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ¶¶ 62–65, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011); RAYSIDE, supra note 18. 
 22.  See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 21, ¶¶ 38–39; COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 20, at 51–69; EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 33–35; SABINE JANSEN & THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, FLEEING 
HOMOPHOBIA: ASYLUM CLAIMS RELATED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN 
EUROPE (2011); JERNOW, supra note 19, at 285–305. 
 23.  See, e.g., IAN CURRY-SUMMER, ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS REGISTERED?: THE SUBSTANTIVE 
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF NON-MARITAL REGISTERED RELATIONSHIPS IN 
EUROPE (2005); MAN YEE KAREN LEE, EQUALITY, DIGNITY, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A RIGHTS 
DISAGREEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (2010); LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN 
EUROPE: NATIONAL, CROSS-BORDER AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES (Katharina Boele-Woelki & 
Angelika Fuchs eds., fully rev. 2d ed. 2012); LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A 
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs 
eds., 2001); YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY 
PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002); JENS RYDSTRÖM, ODD COUPLES: A 
HISTORY OF GAY MARRIAGE IN SCANDINAVIA (2011); BEA VERSCHRAEGEN, 
GLEICHGESCHLECHTLICHE “EHEN” (1994); KEES WAALDIJK & ERIC FASSIN, DROIT CONJUGAL ET 
UNIONS DU MÊME SEXE-MARIAGE, PARTENARIAT ET CONCUBINAGE DANS NEUF PAYS EUROPÉENS 
(2008); KEES WAALDIJK ET AL., MORE OR LESS TOGETHER: LEVELS OF LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
MARRIAGE, COHABITATION AND REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP FOR DIFFERENT-SEX AND SAME-SEX 
PARTNERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (2005); Michael Coester, Same-
Sex Relationships: A Comparative Assessment of Legal Developments across Europe, 4 EUR. J. L. 
REFORM 585 (2002); William N. Eskridge et al., Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships 
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• recognition or non-recognition of same-sex parenting.24 
I want to explore whether there is some system in this diverse field or 
at least some common denominator of the different phenomena that make 
up the field of sexual orientation law.  In other words, I am looking for an 
orientation for sexual orientation law, a single concept with which to 
understand sexual orientation law and its development. 
My thesis is that the right to establish and develop relationships can be 
seen as a common denominator to all main phenomena in the field of 
sexual orientation law.25  This is so because sexual orientation is all about 
relating to others.  Sexual orientation is about intimate behavior between 
people, about amorous relationships between people, and/or about 
attraction to people: people of the same gender, people of different gender, 
people of any gender.  The right to establish and develop relationships has 
been recognized as one aspect of the human right to respect for one’s 
private life.  Both the European and Inter-American Courts of Human 
Rights and the highest courts of several countries now recognize this 
right.26  Today, I propose to call this “the right to relate.” 
This right to relate can help to clarify issues in sexual orientation law 
and help to explain the general direction that sexual orientation law is 
taking. 
 
and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 4 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP art. 4 (Jan. 2004); Caroline 
Forder, European Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371 
(2000). 
 24. See, e.g., LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE, supra note 23; Nancy G. 
Maxwell & Caroline J. Forder, The Inadequacies in U.S. and Dutch Adoption Law to Establish Same-
Sex Couples as Legal Parents: A Call for Recognizing Intentional Parenthood, 38 FAM. L.Q. 623 
(2004); Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents/Recognizing Parents but Not 
Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
711 (2000); WAALDIJK ET AL., supra note 23. 
 25.  A similar point has been made by Eric Gitari.  See The Freedom of Intimate Association for 
Sexual and Gender Outlaws, IDENTITY KENYA, Feb. 2012, at 28, available at 
http://issuu.com/denisnzioka/docs/identity_magazine_february_2012_issue (calling the right to 
establish and develop relationships a “golden thread” that lies “[b]ehind almost every concern in all 
sexual orientations.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984); National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 30 para. 32 (S. Afr.); X v. 
Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86, 87 (1976); Niemietz v. Germany, 251 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, ¶ 29 (1992); Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, ¶ 129 (Aug. 30, 2010).  In each 
of these cases, the respective bodies for the first time used language about a right to establish and 
develop human relationships (with small variations in language). For a more detailed discussion, see 
infra Part V. 
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III. COMPARATIVE 
The need to find a common denominator is especially relevant when 
conducting comparative legal studies on sexual orientation, which is the 
plan with my chair in “comparative sexual orientation law.” 
Traditional comparative legal studies compare similar laws in 
different systems or different legal solutions to similar problems in 
different systems.27  When comparing different solutions to similar 
problems, comparative lawyers look for functional equivalence: they look 
for “institutions performing the same role or solving the same problem.”28  
The evaluation of whether laws or problems are “similar” enough to make 
them comparable has caused a lot of academic writing.  One convincing 
answer is that “any thing can be compared with any other thing.”29 
Comparability does not pose a problem in the global field of sexual 
orientation law.  Throughout the world there are numerous similar and 
different laws that seem to address the same problem. 
I will first give a few examples of comparable similar laws.  A large 
majority of countries in the world have, or used to have, specific rules 
criminalizing certain forms of homosexual sex.30  Similarly, all countries in 
the world have, or used to have, implicit or explicit rules that exclude 
same-sex couples from marriage.31  Meanwhile, a growing number of 
countries have enacted legislation to prohibit forms of anti-homosexual 
discrimination,32 and countries increasingly have statutes or judgments that 
open up some or all legal aspects of marriage to same-sex couples.33  Such 
laws can be compared in terms of legislative detail, geographic spread, 
political history, or practical operation. 
Comparisons between the very different laws in the field of sexual 
 
 27.  For an overview of comparative law thinking with respect to the notion of comparability, see 
generally ESIN ÖRÜCÜ, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: VARIATIONS ON A THEME FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19–32 (2004). 
 28.  Esin Örücü, Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law, 8 EUR. J. L. REFORM 29, 33 
(2006). 
 29.  ÖRÜCÜ, supra note 27, at 20. 
 30.  For a list of at least 76 countries that still criminalize homosexual acts and for detailed 
information about their legislation, see LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY & JINGSHU ZHU, INT’L LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASS’N, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA – A WORLD SURVEY 
OF LAWS: CRIMINALISATION, PROTECTION AND RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX LOVE (2013), available at 
http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2013.pdf. 
 31.  See id. at 30 (listing countries that permit same-sex couples to marry). 
 32.  See id. at 25–27 (listing countries that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in their 
constitution or in employment). 
 33.  See id. at 31 (listing countries that now offer marriage, or some or all rights of marriage to 
same-sex couples). 
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orientation are also possible and even more interesting.  This is because, in 
the field of sexual orientation law, all laws on sexual offenses, marriage, 
parenting, discrimination, violence, asylum, and information can be seen as 
addressing one basic problem.  In virtually all countries of the world, this 
problem arises from two conflicting facts of life.  First, there is the fact that 
a segment of the population—in any country that I know of—has objections 
to intimate behavior and/or amorous relationships between persons of the 
same sex.34  Second, there is the fact that a segment of every population 
is—in their attractions, behavior, or relationships—oriented toward persons 
of the same sex (or of both sexes).35  Certain criminal, family, and anti-
discrimination laws; occasional laws regulating information;36 and various 
other kinds of law try to address the problem presented by these two 
conflicting facts.  The function of any of these laws is either to restrict or to 
increase the possibilities for individuals to relate to someone of the same 
sex.37  Thus, all criminal, labor, family, and other laws that restrict these 
possibilities are functionally equivalent, as are the various laws that 
increase these possibilities.  For this reason as well, it is possible to see the 
 
 34.  The assumption in the functionalist approach to comparative law is that there are shared 
problems and needs in all societies.  Örücü, supra note 28, at 33.  Various studies seem to confirm this 
assumption with respect to objections against homosexuality.  See, e.g., Online Data Analysis, WORLD 
VALUES SURVEY, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeStudy.jsp (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) 
(documenting, somewhat crudely, the percentage of respondents who would not like to have  
“homosexuals” as neighbors or who would consider “homosexuality” always justified, never justified, 
or something in between; the results for these two questions can be found by first selecting the relevant 
years and relevant countries and then searching for “homosexuals” and “homosexuality” to find the 
relevant questions). 
 35.  See Edwin Cameron, Constitutional Protection of Sexual Orientation and African 
Conceptions of Humanity, 118 S. AFRICAN L. J. 642, 649 (2001) (“We know that at all stages of human 
existence, people of the same sex have been erotically and emotionally attracted to each other and have 
found affinity and bonding and commitment with each other—on all continents, in all peoples, amongst 
all cultures and at all times and all places.”). 
 36.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Fedotova v. Russia, Comm. No. 1932/2010, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/106 (Oct. 31, 2012) (condemning laws prohibiting homosexual propaganda like those recently 
adopted locally and now also nationally in  Russia); see also European Comm. of Social Rights, 
Council of Eur., International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v. 
Croatia, Merits, Collective Complaint No. 45/2007 (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.coe.int/t/ 
dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/CC45Merits_en.pdf (requiring a minimum availability of 
non-biased information in schools). 
 37.  The intention behind some such laws, as opposed to the function thereof, may be a desire to 
find a balance between demands to restrict and demands to increase possibilities for same-sex 
relationships.  See Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in 
the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, 
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 437, 440 (describing what I refer to as the “law 
of small change” as follows: “any legislative change advancing the recognition and acceptance of 
homosexuality will only be enacted, if that change is either perceived as small, or if that change is 
sufficiently reduced in impact by some accompanying legislative ‘small change’ that reinforces the 
condemnation of homosexuality.”). 
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right to relate as the common denominator of comparative legal studies on 
sexual orientation.38 
The notion of functional equivalence also highlights the possibility 
that non-legal phenomena, such as bullying, queer bashing, corrective rape, 
rejection for a job vacancy, eviction from housing, biased education, or any 
other form of unofficial homophobia, can also restrict possibilities for 
people to relate to persons of the same-sex.  These phenomena include the 
subtle and less subtle ways in which heterosexuality is socially and 
culturally promoted or made obligatory.39  The effects of these non-legal 
phenomena are often the same as the effects of anti-homosexual laws.  For 
example, in a country where the criminal law only prohibits homosexual 
sex between men, relations between women may be even more restricted 
by social mechanisms that make heterosexuality compulsory.  Anti-
homosexual laws and anti-homosexual practices appear to be functionally 
equivalent.  Both can have a very negative impact, not only on the direct 
victims but also on lesbian, gay, bisexual, intersex, and transgender 
individuals in general.  Both legal and unofficial forms of homophobia can 
cause fear in many people.  They can terrorize individuals other than the 
direct victims40 and scare them into secrecy, abstinence, and solitude.  This 
fear can lead to serious forms of suffering, self-hate, and even suicide.41  
Various studies have found that lesbians, gays, and bisexuals could be 
twice as likely as heterosexuals to attempt suicide or to consider it.42  It 
seems probable that anti-homosexual laws and practices are at least 
 
 38.  Some comparatists might call the right a possible “tertium comparationis.”  See Örücü, supra 
note 28, at 36 (defining tertium comparationis as “a common comparative denominator as the third unit 
besides the two legal . . . elements to be compared”). 
 39.  See CLARKE ET AL., supra note 13, at 121 (citing Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality 
and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY (1980)) (discussing some of these, including 
social, cultural, or economic pressures to marry, arranged marriages, expectations of proper partners to 
bring to a school dance, homosexual curative therapy, and “corrective” rape). 
 40.  In that sense anti-homosexual violence (and other forms of homophobia) share a key 
characteristic with terrorism.  Often quoted is Bruce Hoffmann’s line that terrorism is “meant to 
produce psychological effects that reach far beyond the immediate victims of the attack.”  Bruce 
Hoffman, The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, ATLANTIC, June 2003, at 40, available at  http://www. 
theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2003/06/hoffman.htm. 
 41.  CLARKE ET AL., supra note 13, at 135. 
 42.  Id. at 137; Michael King et al., A Systematic Review of Mental Disorder, Suicide, and 
Deliberate Self Harm in Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual People, 8 BMC PSYCHIATRY 70, 83 (2008), 
available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-244X-8-70.pdf; see also Niels Kooiman,  
Zelfacceptatie, psychisch welbevinden en suïcidaliteit, in NIET TE VER UIT DE KAST. ERVARINGEN VAN 
HOMO- EN BISEKSUELEN IN NEDERLAND 66, 74 (Saskia Keuzenkamp et al. eds., 2012), available at 
http://www.scp.nl/content.jsp?objectid=29563 (reporting figures that suggest suicidal thoughts are 
much more common among gay men and lesbian women than among the general population). 
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partially to blame.43 
Similarly and conversely, there appears to be functional equivalence 
between decriminalization laws, anti-discrimination laws, legal partnership 
recognition, and non-legal means, such as the use of unbiased information 
in education or same-sex-friendly statements of opinion leaders.44  All such 
legal and non-legal phenomena can make it easier for people to feel safe 
and confident enough to establish and develop a relationship with someone 
of the same sex. 
The right to relate can thus operate as the common denominator in 
comparative legal studies on sexual orientation law.  This is not to 
underestimate the many differences between countries and regions of the 
world.  Comparative studies will highlight such differences and possible 
trends of convergence and divergence.45  A first step in comparative legal 
research is conceptualization, which “is the recognition of the need for a 
level of abstraction of concepts.”46 
IV. SEXUAL? 
The notions of sex, gender, or sexual activity could perhaps be other 
candidates for a common denominator in sexual orientation law.  This 
would be problematic, however.  Attitudes towards sex, gender, and sexual 
activity may indeed be relevant in explaining why there is so much 
exclusion of and prejudice against certain sexual orientations.  Yet, sex, 
 
 43.  See King et al., supra note 42, at 84 (“[I]t is likely that the social hostility, stigma and 
discrimination that most LGB people experience is at least part of the reason for the higher rates of 
psychological morbidity observed.”); Kooiman, supra note 42, at 75 (indicating that homosexuals 
whose parents do not accept their homosexual orientation or who have experienced negative responses 
regarding their orientation are more likely to have suicidal thoughts). 
 44.  See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Video Message: Panel Discussion on Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity, 22nd Meeting, News & Media: United Nations Webcast, UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 
7, 2012), http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/03/secretary-general-video-msg-panel-discussi 
on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-22nd-meeting.html (transcript available at http:// 
www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5900) (speaking to the United Nations Human Rights 
Council against such violence).  A very popular “remix” version of the Secretary-General’s speech 
appeared on YouTube.  AllOutorg, ** Inspiring Video** Ban Ki-Moon: The Time Has Come. REMIX!, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUizJUQIbq4. 
 45.  See, e.g., James D. Wilets, From Divergence to Convergence?: A Comparative and 
International Law Analysis of LGBTI Rights in the Context of Race and Post-Colonialism, 21 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 631, 684–85 (2011) (“[There is a] growing convergence in state policies towards 
LGBTI rights in South America, Europe, Oceana, and North America.  Even the markedly divergent 
approaches . . . between the United States and many of the world’s industrialized democracies appear to 
be diminishing to some extent. . . .  There continues to be a divergence in the legal approach to same-
sex relationships among those states that were once British colonies and, to a lesser extent, colonies of 
other European powers.”). 
 46.  Örücü, supra note 28, at 37. 
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gender, and sexual activity do not fully explain why homosexual 
orientation should be protected against such discrimination, why same-sex 
intimacy and same-sex partners should be recognized, or why, in many 
parts of the world, they are gradually receiving some legal recognition. 
Furthermore, the meaning of the words “sex” and “gender” are 
ambiguous, especially in the context of sexual orientation.  Ask a 
homosexual or heterosexual person whether they prefer persons of a 
particular gender or persons of a particular sex: they will be puzzled.47  
Even if some of us can distinguish intellectually between the notions of 
gender and sex, we rarely are able to distinguish between the sex and the 
gender of the person we love.  In law, as in real life, the words sex and 
gender are generally used as synonyms.48  But sex in that wide sense covers 
only one meaning of the English word “sex”: the sex to which one 
belongs.49 
The other meaning of “sex” refers to the sex one does: sexuality (i.e. 
sexual activity).  In the context of sexual orientation, however, both 
meanings of the word “sex” are linked: many people prefer to have sex 
with someone of a particular gender.  It is not exactly clear how both 
notions are linked, as different people experience this link in a variety of 
ways.  Is it only sex that we prefer to have with someone of a particular 
gender?  Or are there also other forms of contact that we like to have with 
someone of a particular gender?  And if so, do we want these other forms 
of contact because we want to have sex, or do we want to have sex because 
we want to have other forms of contact too?  Or put differently: when we 
fall in love with someone of a particular gender, is that a cause or an effect 
of our desire to have sex with that person?  Or is it actually the same thing?  
 
 47.  Such confusion also exists in scholarly research in sexology judging from Michael Kauth’s 
critical discussion of literature.  See Michael R. Kauth, Revealing Assumptions: Explicating Sexual 
Orientation and Promoting Conceptual Integrity, 5 J. BISEXUALITY 79, 82–83 (2005) (describing the 
imprecise manner in which many scholarly articles have approached the two concepts, often 
incorporating social prejudices into their analyses). 
 48.  The U.N. Human Rights Committee uses the words “sex” and “gender” (and “sex-based” and 
“gender-based”) interchangeably.  See, e.g., Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CCPR 
General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), 68th Sess., 
Mar. 13–31, 2000, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000); see also Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cultural Rights, Econ. & Soc. Council, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), 42d Sess., May 4–22, 2009, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009) 
(“[T]he notion of the prohibited ground ‘sex’ has evolved considerably to cover not only physiological 
characteristics but also the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, 
which have created obstacles to the equal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.”). 
 49.  In Dutch, the sex-one-is is referred to as “sekse” and the sex-one-does as “seks.”  But in 
Dutch, as in English, the corresponding adjective is the same for both nouns: “seksueel” (sexual), which 
I believe is also the main adjective corresponding to the noun “gender.” 
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Perhaps scientists from other disciplines will be able to solve these 
puzzles.50 
For most people who fall in love with someone, knowing the degree to 
which their feelings can be attributed to that person’s sex or gender or to 
the prospect of sexual and/or other activity with that person will remain 
virtually impossible.  In the concept of sexual orientation, one adjective 
(“sexual”) is being used to refer to the sex of the partners, to the gender of 
the partners, and to the sexual activity that might take place between 
them.51 
Therefore the notion of “sex” (or “sexuality”) is too complex and too 
confusing to act as the common theme in a newly established field of law.  
Furthermore, the whole point of a human rights approach to sexual 
orientation law is that sex, gender, and sexuality should not be legally 
relevant.  The law should be indifferent to the sex or gender of the lovers 
involved and, in general, to the sexual or non-sexual character of their love.  
Indeed, the legal recognition of heterosexual love (in such institutions as 
marriage and cohabitation) surpasses the sexual aspects of that love and 
extends, for example, to joint parental authority, survivor’s pensions, and 
alimony.  Sexual orientation law similarly extends beyond sexuality.  For 
this reason, the use of the word “sexuality” as a synonym for “sexual 
orientation” (or as a generic term for homosexuality, heterosexuality, and 
bisexuality) is inaccurate and misleading.  Moreover, not every lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual person wants to be defined as a sexual being or as 
somewhere between masculine and feminine. 
Therefore, in the search for a common ground in sexual orientation 
law, sex, gender, and sexuality can largely be disregarded. 
V. ORIENTATION! 
Today I submit that orientation is the key component of sexual 
orientation and that the field of comparative sexual orientation law can be 
captured in the right to relate.52  This is true not only for same-sex and 
different-sex relationships but also for same-sex and different-sex behavior 
 
 50.  Michael Kauth provides a critical assessment of what scientists are contributing to this field.  
See Kauth, supra note 47, at 82 (“Recognizing one’s own implicit conceptual assumptions is not easy 
and may explain in part the lack of conceptual clarity about sexual orientation in the literature.”). 
 51.  In the word “homosexual,” the same functions are performed by the suffix “-sexual.”  See 
Kees Waaldijk, “Handelingen welke de indruk konden wekken van tederheden zoals die tussen 
geliefden plegen te worden gewisseld”—Over de woorden die de rechter gebruikt om homoseksualiteit 
aan te duiden 1, 10–14 (July 1981) (unpublished LL.M paper, University of Amsterdam & Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam) (exploring the double function of that part of the word “homoseksualiteit”) 
(on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law). 
 52.  See supra Part II. 
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and attraction and for lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities, lifestyles, and 
expressions.  All of this centers on persons being oriented towards one or 
more other persons or, in other words, on persons relating to each other.53  
This is something about which the law should not be indifferent. 
The fact that homosexuality has to do with sex, gender, and sexuality 
may explain much of the hostility towards homosexual behavior, 
relationships, and individuals.  The fact that homosexuality is an 
orientation, however, can explain why this legal and social hostility has 
caused such intense suffering.  Many legal and social obstacles to same-sex 
affection have frustrated and continue to frustrate people in one of their 
most basic human needs: the need to relate to other human beings.  That 
homosexuality is essentially about this need can also explain why law in 
many places is slowly becoming more same-sex-friendly.54  Remarkable 
progress has been made in the legal recognition of homosexuality in many 
countries of the world and in many international organizations.55  It seems 
safe to assume that this progress has been helped significantly by the 
recognition (by a growing number of lawmakers, judges, and others) that 
homosexuality is not only about sex, gender, and sexuality but primarily 
about people relating to other people: about affection and love. 
Relating to other human beings is as fundamentally human as eating 
or as creativity.  The psychologist Abraham Maslow powerfully formulated 
“relating” as a fundamental human need in 1943.56  His theory has been 
 
 53.  A point that I will not further explore here is that “[t]he ways a human being ‘chooses’ to be 
and to relate to others are mutually dependent.”  Michele Grigolo, Sexualities and the ECHR: 
Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1023, 1042 (2003).  The close link 
between relating and being has also been made in the field of psychology.  See Steven J. Hanley & 
Steven C. Abell, Maslow and Relatedness: Creating an Interpersonal Model of Self-Actualization, 42 J. 
Humanistic Psychol. 37, 38–39 (2002) (criticizing Maslow for presenting relationships as mere “tools” 
by which the “love and belongingness needs are met”); id. at 55 (speaking of “relatedness”—even of 
the “poetry of relatedness”—and of “our ability to extend ourselves in relationships to each other and 
the world around us”). 
 54.  There has been a noticeable shift in the views of the UN Human Rights Committee.  See 
Fedotova v. Russia, Comm. No. 1932/2010, ¶ 10.8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/106 (Oct. 31, 2012) (holding a 
regional administrative ban on “propaganda of homosexuality among minors” a violation of human 
rights (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hertzberg v. Finland, Comm. No. 61/1979, ¶ 161, U.N. Doc. 
A/37/40 (Apr. 2, 1982) (holding Finland’s penal prohibition of “encouragement to indecent behaviour 
between members of the same sex” not a human rights violation).  For an example of an important shift 
in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see Schalk & Kopf, infra note 109. 
 55.  See PAOLI ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 30, at 20–32 (listing the legal situations in all 
countries of the world and indicating the years in which major legal changes took place); WAALDIJK & 
BONINI-BARALDI, supra note 7, at 204–06 (sketching the very rapid legal developments regarding 
sexual orientation in Europe since the 1980s). 
 56.  A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 Psychol. Rev. 370, 380 (1943). 
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popularized, criticized, and developed by many other scholars.57  Maslow 
emphasized that “love needs” and “love and affection and belongingness 
needs”58 are concepts that “involve both giving and receiving love” and 
that the “thwarting of these needs is the most commonly found core in 
cases of maladjustment and more severe psychopathology.”59  Furthermore, 
he stressed that “love is not synonymous with sex” and can include 
“friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children” and “affectionate relations 
with people in general . . . a place in [one’s] group.”60  This seems to be a 
direct precursor of terminology regarding the fundamental right to establish 
and develop relationships with others that courts started to use in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. 
It is almost a standard exercise in human rights courses to compare the 
various categories of human needs identified by Maslow in 1943 with the 
various human rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1947.61  There are many parallels, ranging from the link between 
Maslow’s “physiological needs” and the Universal Declaration’s right to 
food62 to that between Maslow’s “safety needs” and the Universal 
Declaration’s right to security of person63 to that between Maslow’s “need 
for self-actualization” and the Universal Declaration’s rights relating to 
education and culture.64  Apart from the articles on “marriage”65 and 
“family,”66 however, the words “love” and “affection” did not make it into 
the text of the Universal Declaration.  Neither did “friendship” or 
“relationship.”  The same is true for almost all human rights treaties that 
were adopted thereafter.67 
It was not until May 1976 that a human rights body acknowledged 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Hanley & Abell, supra note 53. 
 58.  Maslow, supra note 56. 
 59.  Id. at 381. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  But see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 14 (2nd ed. 
2003) (criticizing founding human rights on human needs, instead stating that “[h]uman rights are 
‘needed’ not for life but for a life of dignity”). 
 62.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 25; Maslow, supra note 56, at 
372. 
 63.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 3; Maslow, supra note 56, at 376. 
 64.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15, arts. 22, 26; Maslow, supra note 56, 
at 382. 
 65.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 16. 
 66.  Id. arts. 12, 16, 23, 25. 
 67.  But cf. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 
28, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (establishing that “[e]very individual shall have the duty 
to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at 
promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance”). 
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“the right to establish and to develop relationships with other human 
beings,” when the European Commission of Human Rights considered this 
right to be included—”to a certain degree”—in the right to respect for 
private life that is explicitly guaranteed by article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The Commission announced this right in 
two cases.  In the first case, X v. Iceland, which concerned a prohibition by 
the city of Reykjavik on the keeping of dogs, it wrote: 
 
  The question before the commission . . . is . . . whether the keeping of 
a dog belongs to “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
  For numerous anglo-saxon and French authors the right to respect for 
“private life” is the right to privacy, the right to live, as far as one wishes, 
protected from publicity. 
  In the opinion of the Commission, however, the right to respect for 
private life does not end there.  It comprises also, to a certain degree, the 
right to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, 
especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfillment of 
one’s own personality.68 
 
The second case was decided the next day and concerned a challenge 
to the regulation of abortion in Germany.  Quoting X v. Iceland and 
emphasizing the words “to a certain degree,” the Commission added “that 
therefore sexual life is also part of private life; and in particular that legal 
regulation of abortion is an intervention in private life which may or may 
not be justified under Article 8(2).”69 
In 1984 the U.S. Supreme Court held that “choices to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against 
undue intrusion by the State.”70  Deriving its position from two lines of 
precedent, the Court characterized this right as the “freedom of intimate 
association.”71 
 
 68.  App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86, 87 (1976) (citations omitted). 
 69.  Brüggemann v. Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 103, 115 
(1976). 
 70.  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). 
 71.  See id. at 617–18 (“Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected ‘freedom of 
association’ in two distinct senses.  In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to 
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by 
the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central 
to our constitutional scheme.  In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a 
fundamental element of personal liberty.  In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, 
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”). 
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Given the high profile controversies surrounding abortion both in 
Europe and in the United States at the time,72 it seems likely that the Court 
was aware of the Commission decisions.  It is even more probable that the 
Court was relying in part on a 1980 article by Karst,73 although the Court 
defined “intimate association” slightly differently than did Karst.  Karst did 
not refer to Maslow or to the Commission.  Citing several psychologists,74 
he coined the phrase “freedom of intimate association” based on the 
Court’s ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut.75  In Griswold, a case 
concerning the right of a married couple to use contraception, the Court had 
called marriage both “intimate” and “an association.”76  Those words may 
well have been an echo of the writings of John Witherspoon.  In the late 
18th century, he gave a list of the “perfect rights in a state of natural 
liberty,” including a man’s “right to associate, if he so incline, with any 
person or persons, whom he can persuade (not force)—Under this is 
contained the right to marriage.”77  Witherspoon’s formulation may be 
abstract enough to support the articulation of a “right to intimate life” that 
goes beyond marriage.78 
The Commission was likely aware in 1976 of the famous Griswold 
case.  This awareness does not quite explain why the Commission was 
inspired that year to articulate a far more general right to establish and to 
develop relationships with other human beings, but the Commission may 
have been aided by its declaration the previous year that “a person’s sexual 
life” is an “important aspect” of private life.79  Social and cultural trends of 
the 1960s and 1970s may of course also have had an impact on the 
Commission. 
In later years, other national courts, international courts, and political 
lawmakers have started to recognize that the orientation of human beings 
toward other human beings should be respected, including when that 
 
 72.  The similarity between the language used in the European and American decisions is striking, 
but the author has not been able to discern whether the U.S. Supreme Court, directly or indirectly, was 
inspired by the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights.  Nor has the author discovered 
whether the Court or the Commission relied on Maslow or similar psychological literature. 
 73.  Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
 74.  Id. at 632. 
 75.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 76.  Id. at 486 (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a 
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”). 
 77.  John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 69 (Varnum Lansing Collins ed., 1912). 
 78.  RICHARDS, supra note 16, at 74–75. 
 79.  X v. Germany, App. No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46, 54 (1975). 
WAALDIJK MACRO CORRECTED CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  3:14 PM 
2013] THE RIGHT TO RELATE 179 
orientation is between people of the same sex or gender and when it 
expresses itself through sexual desire or activity.  This has led many courts 
to interpret international, national, and sub-national legal prohibitions of 
discrimination to include sexual orientation (or similar terms)80 and has 
resulted in several such statutes explicitly prohibiting discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.81  Sexual orientation is now also explicitly mentioned 
in a few international treaties.82  More fundamentally, the general notion 
that the orientation of human beings toward other human beings should be 
respected has gained strong recognition in human rights law.  The right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings has now been 




 80.  See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994) (providing the first holding by an international human rights 
body that discrimination based on sexual orientation is covered by a treaty article prohibiting 
discrimination in general); see also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Decision 245/02, ¶ 169 (2006) (“The aim of [the principle of 
non-discrimination provided under Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights] is 
to ensure equality of treatment for individuals irrespective of nationality, sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinion, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”); Mouta v. Portugal, 1999-IX 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, ¶¶ 35–36 (concluding in a parental custody case that the father’s homosexuality had 
been a decisive factor in the final decision of the national court and that such a distinction based on 
sexual orientation was not acceptable under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights); 
Sutherland v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD22, ¶ 66 (1997) (finding that “no objective and 
reasonable justification exists for the maintenance of a higher minimum age of consent to male 
homosexual, than to heterosexual, acts”); Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 83–93 (February. 24, 2012) (holding that 
denying a right based on sexual orientation would violate Article 1.1 of the American Convention). 
 81.  See PAOLI ITABORAHY &  ZHU, supra note 30, at 27 (listing South Africa’s 1994 constitution 
as the first national constitution to include an explicit prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination 
and noting that it has been followed by six other countries and parts of several others); Cameron, supra 
note 35, at 645 (“The fact that sexual orientation is mentioned in the [Constitution’s] list of protected 
conditions means that gays and lesbians are expressly and unequivocally included in the embracing 
conception of South African nationhood, for which the liberation struggle was fought.”); Kees 
Waaldijk, Legal Recognition of Homosexual Orientation in the Countries of the World (Feb. 22, 2009) 
(presented in conference binder: International Lesbian and Gay Law Association, The Global Arc of 
Justice – Sexual Orientation Law Around the World, The Williams Institute at the University of 
California–Los Angeles, Mar. 11–14, 2009), available at 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/14543 (indicating that Norway became in 1981 the first 
country to explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in national legislation and was followed 
by some sixty other countries). 
 82.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 10, 
19, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47; see also Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence art. 4, opened for signature May 11, 2011, 
C.E.T.S. No. 210 (containing the only other treaty provision, so far, that explicitly mentions 
discrimination based on “sexual orientation” and “gender identity”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union art. 21, Dec. 1, 2009, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 2. 
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  The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an 
exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”.  However, it would 
be too restrictive to limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude 
therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle.  
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right 
to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. 
  There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this 
understanding of the notion of “private life” should be taken to exclude 
activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the 
course of their working lives that the majority of people have a 
significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships 
with the outside world.83 
 
There the court did not explicitly refer to the decisions in which the 
European Commission of Human Rights had first articulated this right.  
Judge Martens, however, had mentioned these decisions a few months 
earlier in a concurring opinion, in which he wrote: 
 
Expulsion severs irrevocably all social ties between the deportee and the 
community he is living in and I think that the totality of those ties may 
be said to be part of the concept of private life, within the meaning of 
Article 8 (art. 8). 
  It is true that, at least at first sight, the text of this provision seems to 
suggest otherwise.  Read as a whole, it apparently guarantees immunity 
of an inner circle in which one may live one’s own, one’s private, life as 
one chooses.  This “inner circle” concept presupposes an “outside world” 
which, logically, is not encompassed within the concept of private life.  
Upon further consideration, however, this “inner circle” concept appears 
too restrictive.  “Family life” already enlarges the circle, but there are 
relatives with whom one has no family life stricto sensu.  Yet the 
relationship with such persons, for instance one’s parents, undoubtedly 
falls within the sphere, which has to be respected under Article 8 (art. 8).  
The same may be said with regard to one’s relationships with lovers and 
friends.  I therefore share the view of the Commission . . . .84 
 
Since 1998, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, perhaps more 
eloquently, has recognized “a right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships 
without interference from the outside community.”85  In 2005, the High 
 
 83.  Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, ¶ 29 (1992). 
 84.  Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 37 ¶ 3 (1992). 
 85.  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 
30 para. 32 (emphasis added) (“The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of 
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Court of Fiji also endorsed such a right.86  In 2010, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, in two cases concerning state responsibility for 
rape by state agents against indigenous women, recognized “the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings”: 
 
  Regarding the alleged violation of Article 11 of the American 
Convention based on the same facts, the Court has specified that . . . its 
contents include, among others, the protection of private life.  Moreover, 
the concept of private life is a wide-ranging term, which cannot be 
defined exhaustively, but includes, among other protected forums, sexual 
life, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings.  The Court finds that the rape of Mrs. Rosendo Cantú 
violated essential aspects and values of her private life, represented an 
intrusion in her sexual life, and annulled her right to decide freely with 
whom to have intimate relations, causing her to lose complete control 
over these most personal and intimate decisions, and over her basic 
bodily functions.87 
 
Like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not contain a right to private life.  
Article 28 of the Charter, however, contains a duty to relate to other human 
beings: “Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his 
fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at 
promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.”88  
Furthermore, other rights in the African Charter, notably the right to 
“respect for . . . life and the integrity of . . . person,” the right to “respect of 
the dignity inherent in a human being,” and the right to “liberty and 
security of . . . person,” arguably imply a right to privacy.89 
 
this area of private intimacy.”); see also id. at 61 para. 117 (Sachs, J., concurring) (“The expression of 
sexuality requires a partner, real or imagined.  It is not for the state to choose or to arrange the choice of 
partner, but for the partners to choose themselves.”). 
 86.  McCoskar v. State, [2005] FJHC 500, 511 (“In my view the Court should adopt a broad and 
purposive construction of privacy that is consistent with the recognition in international law that the 
right to privacy extends beyond the negative conception of privacy as freedom from unwarranted State 
intrusion into one’s private life to include the positive right to establish and nurture human relationships 
free of criminal or indeed community sanction.”). 
 87.  Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 119 (Aug. 31, 2010); Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, ¶ 129 (Aug. 
30, 2010); see also Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 161–62 (Feb. 24, 2012) (considering custody after divorce in the first sexual 
orientation case decided by the court). 
 88.  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 67. 
 89.  Rachel Murray & Frans Viljoen, Towards Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation: The Normative Basis and Procedural Possibilities before the African Commission on 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that 
no one “shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy,”90 but the United Nations Human Rights Committee has not yet 
considered whether this includes a right to establish and develop 
relationships.  In Toonen v. Australia, however, the Committee did note 
that “it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private” is 
covered by the concept of “privacy.”91  It remains unclear whether less 
sexual or less private aspects of homosexual orientation are protected also. 
The European, South African, Fijian and Inter-American formulations 
are broader than the American one, which is limited to certain “intimate” 
human relationships.92 This is relevant because not all sexual or intimate 
behavior is part of a relationship that is already intimate.  A first or second 
date with someone (or indeed a brief encounter or a one-night stand) may 
involve very intimate behavior and deep emotional attraction, but even so, 
it may be too early to speak of an “intimate relationship,” let alone an 
“intimate association.”  The broader formulation therefore seems 
preferable.93  This formulation of the right to relate without the word 
“intimate” would also be preferable to the characterization of sexual 
orientation by the European Court of Human Rights as involving “a most 
intimate aspect of private life.”94  Personal relationships are not always, and 
certainly not all the time, intimate.  Relationships often start in very public 
 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Union, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 86, 90 (2007) (quoting African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 67, arts. 4–6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, sec. 1, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 91.  Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994). 
 92.  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
 93.  In the United States, there seems to be quite a lot of academic writing trying to distinguish 
between intimate and non-intimate relationships or associations.  See Holning Lau, Transcending the 
Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1301 
(2006) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619) (noting that the freedom of intimate association is “generally 
understood as a liberty to make decisions that attend the creation and sustenance of a family” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Karst, supra note 73, at 629 (advocating an inclusive approach to freedom of 
association that has not been fully followed by the courts); Joshua P. Roling, Functional Intimate 
Association Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift to Save the Roberts Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 903 (2012) 
(criticizing the recent judicial approaches to intimate association); Collin O’Connor Udell, Intimate 
Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 278–80 (1998) (proposing a 
more analytic approach to intimacy by defining “qualities that correlate with intimacy”—cohabitation, 
sexual intimacy, explicit or implicit commitment, and the existence of close blood ties—and then listing 
possible relationships based on which of these criteria are met). 
 94.  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 52 (1981) (referring to sexual 
activity as concerning “a most intimate aspect of private life” in holding that Northern Irish laws against 
sex between consenting adult men in private amounted to a violation of the right to respect for private 
life); see also Kozak v. Poland, App. No. 13102/02, ¶ 83 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int 
(referring to sexual orientation as “one of [the] most intimate parts of an individual’s private life”). 
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places (at work, in a disco, online) and often develop through joint public 
behavior (dancing, holding hands, kissing).95  The notion of “establishing 
relationships” also covers pre-relational attraction and affection.  Once 
established, amorous relationships can indeed be very intimate.  But the 
further the relationship develops, the more the partners may take a public 
and social profile as a couple.  Their partnership is then no longer only 
defined by its intimacy.  This very social aspect of their private life can be 
obscured by the use of the word “intimate.”  Another advantage of 
discarding the word “intimate” is that the resulting higher abstraction may 
more readily be recognized as a common human need and as something 
that is also a core element of other fundamental freedoms, especially those 
of religion, assembly, and association. 
Before turning to the legal implications of this fundamental right to 
relate, it seems appropriate to point out that, in large parts of the world, the 
recognition of the right has been enhanced by a combination of several 
non-legal “stepping stones.”  Of these I have already mentioned the 
popularized psychological theory of Maslow that “love needs” are one of 
the five categories of basic human needs. 
Second, there seem to be strong cultural, religious, and economic 
imperatives to form a close relationship with someone.  Precisely because 
there is such a cultural and legal emphasis on loving, partnering, and 
family, the cultural and legal disapproval of same-sex love can affect 
individuals even more.  Homophobia is a stigma on something that, at a 
higher level of generalization, is presented as one of the highest forms of 
happiness.  It is a typical example of a double-bind.  One could say that 
society tells everyone that he or she must find someone to love, but many 
lesbian women and gay men are also told that this must not be someone 
whom they would love to love. 
Third, the gradual recognition of a non-discriminatory right to relate 
owes a lot to the courage and pride of a growing number of women and 
men who have been coming out as same-sex lovers, partners, and 
 
 95.  Cases concerning a gay or lesbian couple being refused service in a bar or restaurant because 
they kissed—as lovers do—have made it to courts and equality bodies in quite a number of countries.  
An example in Ireland has been described in THE EQUALITY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 
30–31 (2007), available at http://www.equality.ie/Files/Annual%20Report%202006.pdf.  The case 
involved two women who were told by the owner of a pub that they would be asked to leave if they 
kissed each other again.  On March 7, 2006, the women won their discrimination case against the pub 
owner in the District Court.  For several similar cases that were decided in Sweden, see VICTORIA 
KAWESA, CENT. AGAINST RACISM, LEGAL STUDY ON HOMOPHOBIA AND DISCRIMINATION ON 
GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY: THEMATIC STUDY SWEDEN 27–28, 40 
(2010), available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1367-LGBT-2010_thematic-
study_SE.pdf. 
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spouses,96 thereby making the point that partnering and indeed marrying is 
not only for heterosexuals.  Two of the most “out” same-sex couples in the 
world are present here today.  In deep respect for them, I take off my hat 
and bow. 
Fourth, there is an extensive body of art, literature, and entertainment 
portraying this psychological need, this cultural duty, and this same-sex 
practice.  The Rector discourages the use of multimedia in this auditorium, 
so I will not play some of the songs and scenes that spring to mind.  Many 
of these do not evoke an existing relationship but a longed-for relationship, 
like poems expressing “to friendship such a boundless deep desire.”97  I 
would just suggest that the audience picture the film 8 Femmes,98 made by 
François Ozon, in which the black housekeeper, a lesbian, sings the 1972 
Dalida song, “Pour Ne Pas Vivre Seul.”99  Or think of Robert, the 
supposedly happy single man in Stephen Sondheim’s 1970 musical 
Company, singing the song “Being Alive.”100 
VI. LAW 
So the right to relate is a right grounded in a human need, in a cultural 
duty, in a gay and lesbian practice, in a multimedia poetic portrayal, and, 
importantly, in hard law. 
The right to establish and develop relationships has been recognized 
explicitly in various human rights cases,101 some of which actually deal 
 
 96.  At least two same-sex couples have written books about marrying in Canada and going to 
court to get that marriage recognized.  See KEVIN BOURASSA & JOE VARNELL, JUST MARRIED: GAY 
MARRIAGE AND THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) (describing the involvement of the authors 
in Halpern v. Canada, a case decided by the Court of Appeal for Ontario); ANN LOUISE GILLIGAN & 
KATHERINE ZAPPONE, OUR LIVES OUT LOUD: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008) 
(describing the authors’ lives and their involvement in Zappone v. Revenue Commissioners). 
 97.  This is the author’s translation of the fourth line (“naar vriendschap zulk een mateloos 
verlangen”) of Jacob Israël de Haan’s poem Aan eenen jongen visscher, which is engraved on the 
Homomonument in Amsterdam.  Jacob Israël de Haan, Aan eenen jongen visscher, in LIEDEREN (1917), 
available at http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/haan008lied01_01/haan008lied01_01_0024.php. 
 98.  8 FEMMES (BIM, Canal+, Centre National de la Cinématographie (CNC), Fidélité 
Productions, Franc 2 Cinéma, Gimages 5, Local Films, Mars Distribution 2002). 
 99.  DALIDA, Pour Ne Pas Vivre Seul, on IL FAUT DU TEMPS (Orlando International Shows, 
Sonopresse 1972).  The author knows of no older song than this in which both love between women and 
marriage between men is explicitly mentioned. 
 100.  STEPHEN SONDHEIM, COMPANY: A MUSICAL COMEDY (Columbia Records 1970). 
 101.  See, e.g., Gillberg v. Sweden, App. No. 41723/06, ¶ 66 (2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (“The concept of private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition.  It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person.  It can therefore embrace 
multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity.  Article 8 protects in addition a right to 
personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and 
the outside world.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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with homosexual orientation.102  Implicitly, the right to relate can also be 
discerned in other national and international decisions, especially those that 
have ended prohibitions of same-sex sexual behavior103 or same-sex 
marriage104 or that have challenged other forms of anti-homosexual 
discrimination.105  Similarly, the enjoyment of the right to relate has been 
greatly advanced by legislative developments on these issues in many 
countries.106 
In international human rights law, homosexual couples were first 
recognized in the context of “a most intimate aspect” of their private life 
(i.e. in their sexual life).107  Later they obtained some recognition as de 
facto cohabiting partners108 and more recently as having family life.109  
Thus far they have not been recognized as being entitled to marry.110  
Similarly, sex between same-sex adults has become legal in over sixty 
 
 102.  After the South African and Fijian courts applied the right to relate in cases challenging the 
criminalization of same-sex sexual activity, see supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text, the 
European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights invoked this right in connection with sexual 
orientation, see E.B. v. France, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 509, ¶ 43 (2008); Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 161–62 (Feb. 24, 
2012). 
 103.  See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 
31, 1994); see also JERNOW, supra note 19, at 7–43 (summarizing national cases that address questions 
concerning constitutional challenges to sodomy laws)). 
 104.  See JERNOW, supra note 19, at 339–80 (summarizing some of the relevant North American 
and South African cases). 
 105.   See, e.g., Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 2008 E.C.R. 
I-1757; Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 199; Atala Riffo and Daughters, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 239; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Young v. Australia, Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Aug. 6, 2003); see also JERNOW, supra note 19, at 47–90, 309–37 
(summarizing many national challenges to discrimination). 
 106.  See generally Waaldijk, supra note 81; PAOLI ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 30, at 20–32 
(both listing the legal situations in every country in the world, indicating the years in which major legal 
changes took place). 
 107.  See Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 52; see also Toonen, Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.2 
(“[A]dult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of ‘privacy.’”). 
 108.  See, e.g., Karner, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 41 (“persons living in a homosexual relationship”); 
Young, Comm. No. 941/2000, ¶ 10.4 (“same-sex partners”). 
 109.  See Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 683, ¶ 94 (2010) (“[T]he Court considers it 
artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy 
‘family life’ for the purposes of of Article 8 [of the European Convention].”); see also Atala Riffo and 
Daughters, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 176–78 (“[T]here was a close relationship between 
Ms. Atala, Ms. De Ramón, Ms. Atala’s older son and the three girls. . . .  Therefore, it is clear that they 
had created a family unit which, as such, was protected under Articles 11.2 and 17.1 of the American 
Convention, since they shared their lives, with frequent contact and a personal and emotional 
closeness . . . .”). 
 110.  Schalk & Kopf, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep.; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Joslin v. New Zealand, 
Comm. No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902 (July 30, 2002). 
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countries during the last fifty years.111  As a result, it is now no longer a 
crime in at least 114 of the 193 member states of the United Nations.112  
Since Norway became the first country to explicitly prohibit anti-
homosexual discrimination in 1981,113 legislation against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation has been adopted in some sixty countries.114  
Same-sex couples enjoy at least some legal recognition in more than thirty 
countries, including the possibility to marry in fourteen countries and in 
parts of three others.115 
A narrow element of the right to establish and develop relationships 
could already be found in the rights to marry, to found a family, and to 
respect for family life.116  As we have seen, international and national 
courts have now articulated the broader and more fundamental right to 
establish and develop relationships as one of the aspects of the right to 
respect for private life,117 which encompasses each of the three narrower 
rights. 
Thus, the new constellation of elements in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights is as follows: 
• The right to respect for private life includes the right to an 
individual life and the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings.118 
• The right to establish and develop relationships includes both 
 
 111.  PAOLI ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 30, at 20–21; see also Kees Waaldijk, Civil 
Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex Partners in Europe, 17 CAN. J. 
FAM. L. 62, 68 (2000) (describing the four waves of decriminalization that took place in European 
countries since France became, in 1791, the first country to take homosexual acts out of the criminal 
law). 
 112.  PAOLI ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 30, at 20–24.  This report also indicates that 15 of the 
114 countries where homosexual acts are legal between adults (and parts or associates of three other 
countries) apply unequal ages of consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts. 
 113.  But cf. Robert Wintemute, Conclusion to LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: 
A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 781–88 (mentioning 
that, at the sub-national level, the District of Columbia and Quebec preceded Norway with such 
legislation in 1973 and 1977, respectively). 
 114.  PAOLI ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 30, at 25–26. 
 115.  Id. at 30–31.  The Netherlands was the first country to offer legal recognition of de facto 
couples (in 1979) and to open up marriage (in 2001), while in 1989 Denmark became the first country 
to introduce registered partnerships for same-sex couples.  Wintemute, supra note 113, at 775–79. 
 116.  See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 67, art. 18 (guaranteeing 
the rights to protection of, and assistance for, the family); Organization of American States, American 
Convention on Human Rights arts. 11, 17, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 90, arts. 17, 23; Council of Europe, Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 8, 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 117.  See supra Part V. 
 118.  Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, ¶ 29 (1992). 
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family and non-family relationships, including relationships 
“of a professional or business nature”.119 
• The right to respect for family life includes marital and 
parenting relationships, as well as non-marital partnerships.120 
• The right to respect for family life includes different-sex and 
same-sex partners.121 
Therefore, family life (including marriage) is now a sub-category of private 
life. 
The question arises whether the right to marry should be seen as an 
aspect of the right to establish relationships or as an aspect of the right to 
develop them.  Today, in most Western cultures, marriage is rarely the start 
of a relationship.  Marriage can no longer be classified as family formation.  
For most couples, marriage is now a form of family formalization.  
Therefore, marriage should primarily be considered under the right to 
develop relationships rather than under the right to establish them. 
The same question can be asked regarding sexual activity.  At least for 
many people in many Western cultures, sex is no longer only a way of 
developing and nurturing an existing relationship: sexual intimacy is also a 
way of establishing a relationship.  Therefore both the rights to establish 
relationships and to develop relationships require that criminalization of 
homosexual behavior must stop. 
Laws prohibiting sexual activity between people of the same sex can 
create enormous obstacles for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to come out, to 
meet potential partners, and to develop relationships.  These laws create 
opportunities for blackmail and extortion,122 generate fear of exposure, 
promote the idea that anti-homosexual discrimination and violence is 
justified, and portray homosexuals as criminals.123  These laws thereby 
have a great negative effect on the possibilities to establish and develop 
relationships. 
Although there has been a constant stream of decriminalizations of 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 56 (1986) (holding that a heterosexual 
couple who had been living together for fifteen years but who were unable to marry because one of 
them was not allowed to obtain a divorce “constitute[d] a ‘family’ for the purposes of Article 8” of the 
European Convention). 
 121.  See supra note 109. 
 122.  See generally INT’L GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS COMM’N, NOWHERE TO TURN: BLACKMAIL AND 
EXTORTION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Ryan Thoreson & Sam Cook eds., 2011), 
available at http://www.iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/484-1.pdf. 
 123.  Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights, 
110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 455–56 (1993). 
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homosexual behavior, especially since the late 1960s,124 for many countries 
decriminalization still seems far away.  It is important to also welcome 
steps that do not yet reach the international minimum standard of complete 
decriminalization125 but that do get closer to meeting that standard and 
thereby allow a few more people to have intimate relationships. 
Examining the experiences of other countries in expanding the right to 
relate provides a long list of possible small steps short of full 
decriminalization.126  For some of these steps (such as a non-prosecution 
policy, selective prosecution, or lenient sentencing), no parliamentary 
legislation is required: just some initiative by the government, the minister 
of justice, the police director, the prosecution service, or the courts.127  Any 
such step already makes it a little easier for people to establish and develop 
relationships.  A progressive realization of this aspect of private life should 
also be possible in some of the more conservative countries of the world.  It 
would be realistic to keep in mind that many European and American 
countries have also moved very slowly, often incrementally, in getting rid 
of their penal provisions on homosexuality.128  Furthermore, one should not 
forget that almost all countries in the world still preserve some form of 
legal condemnation of homosexual orientation by excluding homosexuals 
from some or all aspects of family law.129 
Countries that for the time being preserve the criminalization of 
homosexuality should be encouraged to at least compensate with other 
 
 124.  See Waaldijk, supra note 81 (listing countries that have decriminalized homosexual behavior, 
along with the year of decriminalization). 
 125.  This minimum standard has been set in a series of cases.  See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (setting the standard for Europe); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Toonen 
v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994) (setting the 
standard at the global level). 
 126.  See Waaldijk, supra note 111, at 70–74 (introducing the term “semi-decriminalisation”). 
 127.  For an example of an explicitly stated non-prosecution policy that applied in Scotland when it 
still had legislation in force prohibiting consensual homosexual acts between adult men, see Dudgeon, 
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 18.  Less explicit non-prosecution policies have been implemented in 
Cyprus, Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 485, ¶¶ 12, 23 (1993), and in Tasmania, Toonen, 
Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶¶ 2.2, 6.3, 8.2.  Homosexual acts by consenting adults in private were also 
hardly ever prosecuted in Northern Ireland and Ireland in the last years before their relevant legislation 
was found to be in breach of fundamental human rights, but these two jurisdictions did not have official 
non-prosecution policies.  Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 20, 33, 38 (1988); Dudgeon, 
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 30, 41. 
 128.  All of this is in line with what I call the “law of small change.”  See supra note 37. 
 129.  See Daniel Borrillo, Pluralisme Conjugal ou Hiérarchie des Sexualités: La Reconnaissance 
Juridique des Couples Homosexuels dans l’Union Européenne, 46 MCGILL L.J. 875, 918, 922 (2001) 
(speaking of a “hierarchy of sexualities” and the preservation of an inferior position for homosexual 
couples).  For examples of this practice even in the nine European countries that were the first to 
recognize same-sex couples, see WAALDIJK ET AL., supra note 23, at 43–44. 
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measures supporting the right to relate.  For example: active police action 
in cases of anti-homosexual violence or extortion;130 non-discriminatory 
respect for the freedoms of association, assembly, and information; and 
inclusion of sexual orientation in anti-discrimination laws.  At least four 
countries in Africa that still criminalize homosexual sex have included a 
prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination in laws on employment; 
South Africa introduced a similar prohibition before it decriminalized 
homosexual sex.131 
VII. COMING OUT AND COMING TOGETHER 
The right to relate has two aspects: the right to establish (or enter into) 
relationships and the right to develop (or maintain and nurture) 
relationships.  The right to establish same-sex relationships implies two 
specific rights: 
• the right to come out (as being attracted to one or more 
persons of the same sex); 
• the right to come together (with people of a similar orientation 
and/or of the same sex or with people who do not condemn 
homosexuality). 
These two implied rights are necessary for people to find a potential 
partner that is of the same sex and of the same orientation.  Without at least 
some coming out or some coming together, a woman would never be able 
to establish an intimate relationship with another woman, and a man would 
never be able to establish an intimate relationship with another man.  The 
rights to come out and to come together also help lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
individuals to find friends who personally know what it is to be attracted to 
the same sex, to have a same-sex partner, or to face discrimination in that 
context. 
As part of the right to respect for private life, the right to come out, 
which arguably is already supported by the freedom of expression, is a core 
 
 130.  See, e.g., INT’L GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 122, at 131 (stressing the 
importance of, inter alia, police training and accountability for fighting blackmail and extortion against 
LGBTs in many African countries). 
 131.  For some details of this interesting and promising deviation from the “standard sequence” in 
the legal recognition of homosexual orientation in South Africa, Seychelles, Mozambique, Botswana, 
and Mauritius, see PAOLI ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 30, at 25.  See also Kees Waaldijk, Standard 
Sequences in the Legal Recognition of Homosexuality – Europe’s Past, Present and Future, 4 
AUSTRALASIAN GAY & LESBIAN L.J. 50, 51–52 (1994) (observing that, at least in Europe, there is 
almost a “standard sequence” in which homosexuality is being legally recognized in more and more 
countries: a process that typically starts with the decriminalization of sex between consenting adults and 
the equalization of ages of consent, followed by the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation and 
later by recognition of same-sex partners and possibly same-sex parenting). 
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element in the right to relate.132  The right to come out covers a wide range 
of expressions, from wearing a rainbow armband or displaying subtle codes 
that can be picked up by others to a simple “I think I am in love with you” 
(at least if one says those words to someone who does not yet know that 
one might be attracted to persons of the same sex).  It can range from a 
very private “there is something I want you to know” to telling one’s 
students about one’s wife or telling one’s colleagues about one’s boyfriend.  
It can be done casually or ambiguously.  It is often done by hints, but one 
can also reveal one’s orientation on a webpage, in an interview, or by 
joining a float or a boat in the right parade. 
This demonstrates the fuzzy line between coming out and coming 
together.  Many people come out without saying anything, just by going to 
a place or an event where they will not be assumed to be heterosexual.  
That is one of the reasons why lesbian campsites, cafés, and cruises, as well 
as gay bars, baths, and beaches, are so important.  Likewise, online dating 
sites, LGBT networks at universities and in companies, and gay-straight 
alliances at schools and nursing homes, along with a queer film festival in 
every region, are vital.  They provide chances to meet others who might be 
interested in sharing a feeling or sharing a future.  If coming out and 
coming together were impossible, then same-sex relationships would not be 
formed and established, let alone nurtured and developed. 
The clearest example of this right to come out can perhaps be found in 
refugee law.  As put by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees: 
 
A person cannot be expected or required by the State to change or 
conceal his or her identity in order to avoid persecution.  As affirmed by 
numerous jurisdictions, persecution does not cease to be persecution 
because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoiding 
action. . . .  There is no duty to be “discreet” or to take certain steps to 
avoid persecution, such as living a life of isolation, or refraining from 
having intimate relationships.133 
 
 132.  THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 14 (“The right to privacy ordinarily 
includes the choice to disclose . . . information relating to one’s sexual orientation . . . .”). 
 133.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ¶¶ 25–26 (Nov. 21, 2008) (referencing case law from several 
countries); see also Nicole LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ASIL INSIGHT, July 30, 2009, at 2–3 (praising the UNHCR for 
“finally” recognizing this and other specific problems encountered by members of sexual minorities 
claiming protection as refugees, although remaining critical of various aspects of the Note).  For 
additional references to national policy guidelines and administrative practice, and to case law, 
including the important 2010 judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, HJ (Iran) & HT 
(Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C. 596 
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If that is so in refugee law, the same should surely apply in 
education,134 care,135 and employment,136 including military employment.137  
Coming out is one of the core aspects of sexual orientation and should 
therefore be covered by any applicable prohibition of sexual orientation 
discrimination.  This topic cries out for a thorough comparative legal study 
that looks at the different ways a “right to come out” is being denied, 
recognized, constructed, and applied.  Such a study should take account of 
the functional equivalence of the many ways in which the right to come out 
can be frustrated: police arrests, termination of employment, eviction from 
home, expulsion from school, bullying, violence, etc., and the threat of any 
of these. 
It can be argued that the right to come out also translates into a duty to 
proactively prevent anti-homosexual violence and bullying.  Such a duty 
might apply both in public places and at work, at school, in care, etc.  If a 
public or private environment is unsafe, then the right to come out, the right 
to come together, and thereby the right to relate become illusory. 
 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.), see JANSEN & SPIJKERBOER, supra note 22, at 33–39.  HJ 
(Iran) & HT (Cameroon) held that an applicant 
cannot and must not be expected to conceal aspects of his sexual orientation which he is 
unwilling to conceal, even from those whom he knows may disapprove of it.  If he fears 
persecution as a result and that fear is well-founded, he will be entitled to asylum however 
unreasonable his refusal to resort to concealment may be. 
Id. at 35.  On November 7, 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union, in three cases concerning 
asylum seekers from Senegal, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, came to a similar conclusion. Case C-199/12, 
X v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, ¶ 76, available at http://curia.europa.eu (“When assessing an 
application for refugee status, the competent authorities cannot reasonably expect, in order to avoid the 
risk of persecution, the applicant for asylum to conceal his homosexuality in his country of origin or to 
exercise reserve in the expression of his sexual orientation.”). 
 134.  In the Netherlands, for example, the coming out of a lesbian, bisexual, or gay student in 
primary, secondary, or higher education should be covered by the strict prohibition of discrimination 
based on the “sole fact” of homosexual orientation (a prohibition that, according to article 7(2) of the 
Dutch General Equal Treatment Act, also fully applies in any private school based on religion).  
General Equal Treatment Act, Stb. 1994, No. 230, p. 1. 
 135.  The right to come out should not be frustrated in, for example, homes for the elderly.  If an 
inhabitant of such a home—or a couple of inhabitants—chooses to come out as lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual, there should be no negative response from the management, and there should be adequate 
protection against negative responses from other inhabitants. 
 136.  Discrimination because of someone’s coming out appears to be covered by a directive of the 
Council of the European Union.  Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing a General Framework for 
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.  Discrimination based on 
someone’s coming out is covered in many E.U. member states by legislation implementing the 
Council’s Directive.  See WAALDIJK & BONINI-BARALDI, supra note 7, at 40–41, 112–13, 213–14. 
 137.  See Diane Richardson, Constructing Sexual Citizenship: Theorizing Sexual Rights, 20 
CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 105, 119–200 (2000) (claiming, in reference to the “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” 
policy that applied at the time in the U.S. armed forces, that while “one may have the right to identify as 
a lesbian, one does not necessarily have the right to ‘come out’ and inform others of that identity”). 
WAALDIJK MACRO CORRECTED CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  3:14 PM 
192 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:161 
Of course, public authorities should not deny LGBTs the enjoyment of 
the freedoms of assembly and association.  This already follows from 
constitutions and international human rights treaties guaranteeing those 
freedoms.138  The right to relate and its implied right to come together 
reaffirm that these freedoms are crucial for certain minorities. 
The right to relate, however, is of even greater relevance with respect 
to events and networks inside a private or public organization.  Employees 
of big companies and organizations and students and staff in schools and 
universities in many countries have been holding occasional LGBT 
meetings or have even been starting regular LGBT networks within their 
organizations.  Leiden University is no exception.139  Comparative legal 
research could study the ways in which different legal systems are dealing 
with employers and educational establishments that block such 
initiatives.140  Is refusal to allow such a meeting or network seen as a 
possible form of sexual orientation discrimination or as a possible violation 
of the freedom of assembly or association?  Are arguments being used that 
acknowledge the importance of these initiatives for the right to relate of 
employees and students? 
The right to come together is applicable beyond associations and 
assemblies.  After all, many more informal ways of coming together have 
developed in the same-sex world.  Here, too, the notion of functional 
equivalence is key to understanding the interplay between legal and social 
phenomena.  The effect of a police raid on a private party,141 an imposition 
of administrative or legal hurdles on gay and lesbian bars, or a violent 
homophobic attack on a bathhouse or on people in an open-air cruising area 
is the same: the possibilities for same-sex-oriented individuals to meet 
others are seriously curtailed.  For many people, such avenues for meeting 
others (in addition to meeting and dating spaces online) are an essential 
 
 138.  See Alekseyev v. Russia, App. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08, 14599/09, ¶¶ 68–88 (2010); 
Bączkowski v. Poland, App. No. 1543/06, ¶¶ 61–73 (2007) (holding in both cases that the refusal to 
allow a pride demonstration to take place amounted to a violation of the freedom of assembly 
guaranteed by Article 11 of the European Convention); see also JERNOW, supra note 19, at 93–121 
(summarizing national cases on the constitutional freedoms of assembly and association). 
 139.   See LEIDSCHE GANYMEDES BORREL, http://www.de-lgb.nl (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).  An 
increasing number of companies and other employers have such an LGBT network.  See WORKPLACE 
PRIDE, http://www.workplacepride.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (listing Dutch companies and other 
employers with an LGBT network). 
 140.  Not all European Union member states seem to cover this sort of discrimination in their 
legislative implementation of the Employment Equality Directive.  See WAALDIJK & BONINI-BARALDI, 
supra note 7, at 45–46, 117–18. 
 141.  The most famous example is that of the Queen Boat.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
IN A TIME OF TORTURE: THE ASSAULT ON JUSTICE IN EGYPT’S CRACKDOWN ON HOMOSEXUAL 
CONDUCT (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/egypt0304/egypt0304.pdf. 
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way of establishing relationships.142  The right to relate and its implied 
right to come together make it possible to investigate this legally 
unchartered terrain from a human rights perspective. 
VIII. NURTURING RELATIONSHIPS 
Different countries treat the right of same-sex partners to develop and 
nurture their relationship in a variety of ways.143  Comparative legal studies 
in this field have often focused on one or two elements of this treatment: 
often the status that may be available to same-sex couples that want to 
formalize their relationship or the legal consequences that the law attaches 
to their relationship or to its status.144  For more comprehensive 
comparative research, it seems useful to distinguish analytically between 
five elements of the right to develop relationships: respect, protection, 
recognition, formalization, and recognition of foreign formalization. 
A. Respect 
This follows most directly from the wording of the right from which 
the right to relate has been derived: the right to respect for private life.145  
Not criminalizing the intimate behavior of the partners involved may be 
seen as the bare minimum of respect that is due according to current 
interpretations of international human rights law.146 
B. Protection 
Typically, two types of legislation can protect intimate relationships: 
privacy legislation and anti-discrimination legislation.  Any legal 
prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination should be interpreted as 
also protecting against discrimination based on the same-sex-ness of a 
 
 142.  See Lau, supra note 93, at 1271, 1289–91 (discussing an incident of a dating service refusing 
to match same-sex couples and arguing that recognition should be extended to such “potential couples” 
or “couples-in-development”). 
 143.  The Constitutional Court of South Africa introduced the very appropriate notion of 
“nurturing” a relationship in this context.  See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at 23–24 para. 32. 
 144.  E.g., WAALDIJK ET AL., supra note 23 (calculating and comparing the “level of legal 
consequences” of different types of relationship status in nine European countries). 
 145.  Interestingly, the constitutions of Romania and Moldova require protection and respect not 
only for family and private life but also for “intimate life.”  See CONSTITUȚIA ROMÂNIEI art. 26, Nov. 
21, 1991, M.O.R. (part I) No. 233; CONSTITUȚIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA art. 28, July 29, 1994, M.O. 
No. 1. 
 146.  See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 61 (1981); U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 
31, 1994). 
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relationship.147 
For example, whether a blood bank’s refusal to accept blood donations 
from men in monogamous same-sex relationships while accepting blood 
donations from men in different-sex monogamous relationships is unlawful 
sexual orientation discrimination is a difficult question. One answer is that 
discrimination presupposes a victim and that a denied option to donate 
blood does not make the would-be donor a victim.  As we have seen 
already, however, a measure that excludes someone based on homosexual 
behavior may also indirectly affect other people.148  In a case like this, 
much would depend on the way in which the blood bank explains the 
reasons for its refusal.  That needs to be done sensitively, specifically, and 
accurately.  Unspecified and therefore untenable and offensive 
generalizations claiming that sex between men is many times more 
dangerous than heterosexual sex carry the serious risk of frightening some 
young people back into secrecy, abstinence, or solitude, with all kinds of 
risks for their emotional and physical wellbeing. 
C. Recognition 
The third element is whether the law attaches any legal consequences 
(rights, benefits, obligations, responsibilities) to a same-sex relationship. 
The minimum norm, now well-developed in international human rights 
law, requires that legal consequences that are made available to unmarried 
different-sex partners should also be made available to unmarried same-sex 
partners.149 
With the recognition in 2010 that the relationships of same-sex 
 
 147.  See WAALDIJK & BONINI-BARALDI, supra note 7, at 41 (“[D]ifferential treatment between 
same-sex and different-sex couples . . . may be described as an example of direct (sex or sexual 
orientation) discrimination, because the only relevant criterion that upholds differential treatment is the 
combination of the sexes in the couple”); Lau, supra note 93, at 1306 (“Distinctions between opposite-
sex and same-sex couples should constitute per se discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”).  
This point has been accepted in international case law since Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 
199, and Young v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Aug. 6, 2003).  The Court of Justice of the European Communities has also 
accepted this.  See Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 2008 E.C.R. I-
1757, ¶ 72 (considering a distinction between married different-sex partners and registered same-sex 
partners regarding pensions as potentially constituting “direct discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation”); Case C-249/96, Grant v. S.W. Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-621, ¶¶ 11, 47, 50 (classifying 
differentiation between same-sex and different-sex unmarried cohabitating partners not as prohibited 
sex discrimination but as “discrimination based on sexual orientation,” which at the time was not 
covered by European Community law); see also Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 683, ¶ 99 
(2010) (speaking of the need of same-sex couples “for legal recognition and protection of their 
relationship”). 
 148.  See supra Part III. 
 149.  Karner, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.; Young, Comm. No. 941/2000. 
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partners qualify as “family life” under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights,150 the minimum norm may be starting to 
rise.  It can now be argued that countries should at least provide same-sex 
families with some of the most important legal consequences of marriage.  
The right to develop and nurture relationships may help to decide which 
rights are most important for a couple.  Perhaps the right to seek a 
residence permit for a foreign partner?  Or the right to provide one’s 
partner with some material security in case one dies first?  Or the right to 
assume certain legal and financial responsibilities for one’s partner’s 
children? 
D. Formalization 
Countries take different views as to whether same-sex partners 
deserve the right to formally establish legal ties with each other and/or with 
each other’s children and if so in what manner.  So far, international law 
provides no minimum standard for the formalization of same-sex family 
life because claims of same-sex couples who have wanted to marry have 
been rejected by international human rights bodies.151 
Does the right to relate imply a right to become relatives?  For 
children this can be important: will they get a permanent and legal link to a 
parent’s partner who is in fact like a parent to them?  And what if three or 
four adults, perhaps in two households, are in fact parenting together?  
Different legal systems are experimenting with different ways to meet the 
desire of some same-sex families to formalize all relationships in their de 
facto family. 
In some of the countries where same-sex marriage is possible, a much-
discussed issue is how to deal with refusing registrars152 (i.e. registrars with 
religiously-inspired conscientious objections to performing same-sex 
marriage ceremonies).  If such a registrar were to ask to be replaced by a 
colleague and a couple’s desire to marry were therefore not frustrated, then 
 
 150.  See Schalk & Kopf citation supra note 109. 
 151.  See Schalk & Kopf, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep., ¶ 63; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Joslin v. New 
Zealand, Comm. No. 902/1999, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902 (July 30, 2002). 
 152.  See Bruce MacDougall et al., Conscientious Objection to Creating Same-Sex Unions: An 
International Analysis, 1 CAN. J. HUM. RTS. 127 (2012) (analysing the ongoing discussion in Canada, 
the Netherlands, Scotland, and South Africa).  In Dutch these registrars are called “weigerambtenaren.”  
There is not yet any judicial case law in the Netherlands on the question of whether the dismissal of 
such a civil servant (or the rejection of a job applicant) for refusing to do same-sex marriage ceremonies 
should be considered as religious discrimination.  On April 15, 2008, the Dutch Equal Treatment 
Commission issued an opinion that such a rejection was objectively justified and therefore not 
prohibited as indirect religious discrimination.  Commissie Gelijke Behandeling [Equal Treatment 
Commission], Oordeelnummer [Opinion No.] 2008-40, ¶¶ 3.28, 4 (Nov. 19, 2007). 
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there would not be a direct victim and so probably no case of 
discrimination.  But again, as in the case of blood donation,153 there may be 
indirect victims.  Just imagine a still insecure lesbian or gay child of the 
refusing registrar.  What disastrous signal does that child receive when his 
or her own parent is refusing to help a loving couple to formalize their 
family life?  And what will the child feel when he or she sees that this 
refusal is being tolerated by the law?  Still, making a martyr out of that 
parent would not help the child or anyone else.  The dilemma may be 
solvable by making sure that every child in every primary and secondary 
school at least gets some information that is free from anti-homosexual bias 
and by making sure that every refusing registrar is made fully aware of the 
harmful effects that his or her refusal may have on persons beyond the 
actual marrying couple. 
E. Recognition of Foreign Formalization 
Finally, I could tell sad stories about the non-recognition of foreign 
same-sex marriages, partnerships, and adoptions.  Let me first mention two 
promising judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, requiring 
Luxembourg and Greece to recognize foreign single-parent adoptions.  
These two cases are not about same-sex families, but they are clear 
examples of how the right to relate (as well as the right to non-
discrimination and the right to respect for family life) requires the 
recognition of the foreign formalization of a family relationship. 
In the first case, the court held that Luxembourg must recognize the 
Peruvian adoption of a Peruvian child by a Luxembourg mother, though 
Luxembourg does not allow domestic single-parent adoptions: 
 
  The Court considers that the decision refusing enforcement fails to 
take account of the social reality of the situation.  Accordingly, since the 
Luxembourg courts did not formally acknowledge the legal existence of 
the family ties created by the Peruvian full adoption, those ties do not 
produce their effects in full in Luxembourg.  The applicants encounter 
obstacles in their daily life and the child is not afforded legal protection 
making it possible for her to be fully integrated into the adoptive family. 
  Bearing in mind that the best interests of the child are paramount in 
such a case, the Court considers that the Luxembourg courts could not 
reasonably disregard the legal status validly created abroad and 
corresponding to a family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
Convention.154 
 
 153.  See discussion supra Part VIII.B.  About the notion of indirect victims of anti-homosexual 
discrimination, see supra Part III. 
 154.  Wagner v. Luxembourg, App. No. 76240/01, ¶¶ 132–33 (2007) (citations omitted), available 
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The other case involved the adoption in the United States of a young 
Greek man by his Greek uncle.  The uncle happened to be a monk who had 
become a bishop in Detroit.  Archaic Greek laws prohibited adoptions by 
monks in Greece.  But the court said that these old prohibitions could not 
serve as the basis for refusing to recognize the American adoption.155  Both 
cases recognize that when there is de facto family life and a properly 
obtained foreign formalization of that family life, the foreign formalization 
must be recognized. 
Similar cases and legal arguments, involving an adoption by same-sex 
partners or about a same-sex marriage or registered partnership, are certain 
to come up in national and international courts.156  This is especially 
relevant in the Court of Justice of the European Union because the non-
recognition of foreign family status can cause major obstacles to the 
fundamental freedom of movement within the European Union, as has been 
argued by many authors.157 
The Administrative Tribunals of the United Nations and of the 
International Labor Organization have already decided quite a number of 
such cases.  Both Tribunals have been quite helpful in recognizing same-
sex marriages and partnerships of employees of various international 
organizations.158  Until now, however, only a few transnational cases have 
 
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. 
 155.  Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece, App. No. 56759/08, ¶¶ 61–76 (2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.  The Negrepontis-Giannisis judgment is only available in French, but the 
court has issued an English-language press release. 
 156.  The first examples have already reached national courts.  See JERNOW, supra note 19, at 274–
77 (describing a Slovenian case on foreign adoption); see also Wilkinson v. Kitzinger, [2006] EWHC 
(Fam) 2022 (Eng.), ¶¶ 4, 131 (holding against the petitioners, two women from England who had 
married in Canada and had sought to have their marriage recognized in England and Wales); Zappone 
v. Revenue Comm’rs, [2008] 2 I.R. 417, 513 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (on appeal in the Supreme Court of Ireland) 
(“[I]t is clear that the Plaintiffs’ claim for recognition of their Canadian marriage must fail as must the 
challenge to the relevant provisions of the Tax Code.”).  For more information about the life story of the 
two women from Ireland who were married in Canada and brought this suit to have their marriage 
recognized, see generally GILLIGAN & ZAPPONE, supra note 96. 
 157.  See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, ch. 4; 
HELEN TONER, PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS, FREE MOVEMENT, AND EU LAW (2004); Mark Bell, Holding 
Back the Tide?: Cross-Border Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships within the European Union, 5 
EUR. REV. PRIVACY L. 613 (2004); Elspeth Guild, Free Movement and Same-Sex Relationships: 
Existing EC Law and Article 13 EC, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY 
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 677; Kees Waaldijk, Free 
Movement of Same-Sex Partners, 3 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 271 (1996). 
 158.  See Kees Waaldijk, Same-Sex Partnership, International Protection, in 8 MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1125, ¶¶ 25–27 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012) 
(noting judgments of both tribunals that required international organizations to generally recognize the 
same-sex marriages and registered partnerships of their employees). 
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been decided by any court.159  This is understandable: because of possible 
non-recognition, many same-sex couples are likely deciding not to move to 
certain countries and thus never run into the actual legal obstacles. 
To compensate for this lack of jurisprudence, I have conducted a 
survey of legal experts from most European countries (as well as many 
from outside the European Union).160  The survey consisted of seven 
hypothetical cases of same-sex couples moving from country A to country 
B.  The first results sent in by the legal experts revealed a chaotic mosaic of 
full, partial, unclear, and denied recognitions.  A foreign second-parent 
adoption by a same-sex partner would probably not be recognized in a third 
of the countries surveyed.  Also, for purposes of inheritance law or 
survivor’s pension, a foreign same-sex marriage would probably not be 
recognized in a third of the countries surveyed.  Slightly better were the 
results regarding a residence permit for the non-European Union partner of 
a European Union citizen, but even for that purpose, a foreign same-sex 
marriage or registered partnership would probably not be recognized in a 
quarter of the countries surveyed. 
Perhaps the European Court of Human Rights will notice that a 
majority of European countries that do recognize foreign same-sex 
marriages and partnerships for at least some purposes is forming.  The 
court might then be prepared to apply in such cases the same principles as 
it has in the single-parent adoption cases against Luxembourg and Greece 
described above. In such a case, it might be useful to remind the court that 
it has already recognized the right to develop relationships. Crossing a 
border should not interrupt such relational development, and having 
established a relationship should not present a couple with obstacles to the 
exercise of their freedom of movement. 
* * * 
In short, I submit that the right to develop relationships has been and 
should be made operational through legal respect, legal protection, legal 
recognition, legal formalization, and legal recognition of foreign legal 
formalization.  These five elements of the second aspect of the right to 
relate are an essential complement to the first aspect: the right to establish 
relationships.  As I have articulated in the previous section, this right to 
establish relationships implies the rights to come out and to come together.  
Together these seven elements of the right to relate offer both a research 
agenda for the discipline of comparative sexual orientation law and a 
toolbox for legislative and judicial advancement of sexual orientation law 
 
 159.  See supra note 156. 
 160.  Not yet published. 
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in many parts of the world. 
CONCLUSION 
I have tried to grasp the meaning of sexual orientation.  I have tried to 
underline a fundamental right that has been articulated by some of the most 
important courts in the world: the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings.  I have tried to give it a shorter 
name: the right to relate. 
I have argued that the right to establish relationships implies the rights 
to come out and to come together and that the right to develop relationships 
has been and should be made operational through legal respect, legal 
protection, legal recognition, legal formalization, and legal recognition of 
foreign formalization. 
I have tried to demonstrate that the right to relate has been and can 
continue to be an inspiration for the development of sexual orientation law.  
And I have tried to show that this right can be used as a common 
denominator—as an orientation—in the comparative study of all those laws 
in the world that are anti-homosexual or that are same-sex-friendly. 
A lesson I learned in my research is that many people and many legal 
systems need time to get used to the different aspects of homosexual 
orientation.  One of my aims in teaching comparative sexual orientation 
law is that in the future the legal systems that my students will serve will 
require less time to understand the human need to love and to relate. 
